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11 Introduction
A long-standing problem is to provide an empirical description of the value of an indi-
vidual’s human capital and the associated return on an individual’s human capital. The
value of human capital is in theory simply discounted future earnings. Thus, it is key to
determine how an individual’s earnings and an individual’s stochastic discount factor co-
move. The main diﬃculty is that discount factor properties can only be inferred indirectly
through data on ﬁnancial asset returns or individual choices.
One strategy for making progress on this problem is to take a structural approach
and make parametric assumptions about preferences, as well as assumptions on the exact
structure of an individual’s decision problem. These parameters can then be estimated,
and the value and return to human capital can be characterized using the stochastic
discount factor produced by a solution to an empirically-motivated speciﬁcation of this
decision problem.
In this paper we take a diﬀerent approach. We explore what can be said about
individual human capital values and returns without making parametric assumptions on
preferences and without solving such a decision problem. However, we assume that one
knows two important things: (1) a statistical model for ﬁnancial asset returns and an
individual’s earnings; and (2) some key properties of an individual’s stochastic discount
factor. We assume this discount factor is non-negative, satisﬁes an Euler equation for
each ﬁnancial asset and is no more variable than some speciﬁed upper bound. These
assumptions will not allow one to precisely value an individual’s future earnings unless
future earnings can be replicated by trade in ﬁnancial assets. Nevertheless, upper and
lower bounds on the value of human capital can be determined by pricing the earnings
component that can be replicated by trade in ﬁnancial assets and then bounding the value
of the residual component of earnings.
We view the two approaches as being complementary. If the bounds approach puts
tight bounds on values and returns, then this tells one that all the extra assumptions
and additional data used in the structural approach can only serve to slightly narrow
the value and return to human capital beyond what can be determined from earnings
and asset returns data. In contrast, if the bounds approach implies very loose bounds,
2then this tells one that the additional data and assumptions employed in the structural
approach are critical for reaching conclusions about the return to human capital.
We highlight one area in which an empirical understanding of the value and return
to human capital is relevant. To maintain a constant fraction of overall wealth in stock
holdings, an individual’s direct ﬁnancial holdings of stock and bonds need to be selected
with the value of human capital in mind. If human capital is like stock, then the fraction of
ﬁnancial wealth held in stock would need to increase over the lifetime. If human capital is
like risk-free debt, then the opposite reasoning applies. To make progress on this argument
and give practical advice, one needs to investigate this if condition empirically. To do so,
it is important to adopt the human capital value and return notions used in this paper:
values and returns based on an individual’s stochastic discount factor.
There are three main contributions of the paper. First, we show that value bounds
imply return bounds. Second, we illustrate how all the concepts work within a simple
example. Third, we calculate value and return bounds using U.S. data.
Value and return bounds for U.S. data are determined in two steps. We start by
providing an empirical description of the joint dynamics of male earnings and stock re-
turns. Given such a statistical model, we then calculate value and return bounds using
the restriction that the coeﬃcient of variation of an individual’s stochastic discount factor
is no larger than a given multiple of the conditional Sharpe ratio. If the Euler equation
restriction is to hold, then this coeﬃcient of variation must, at a minimum, be at least as
large as the Sharpe ratio. We ﬁnd that value and return bounds are very loose even after
imposing that the coeﬃcient of variation is at most 1.1 times the conditional Sharpe ratio.
Speciﬁcally, for this upper limit the expected lifetime return to human capital must lie
between −10 and 17 percent per year. This is almost exclusively due to the large amount
of idiosyncratic earnings variation that we estimate from U.S. data, consistent with ﬁnd-
ings from numerous previous empirical studies. We ﬁnd that when all idiosyncratic risk is
eliminated without eliminating aggregate sources of earnings risk, then value and return
bounds are tight. The expected lifetime return to human capital is then between 0.25
and 2.5 percent per year, for a range of restrictions on the coeﬃcient of variation of an
individual’s stochastic discount factor.
3Three literatures are most closely related to the problem that we address. First, there
is a literature on the value of human capital. This literature has almost exclusively focused
on valuing highly aggregated measures of cash ﬂows (e.g. economy-wide earnings or cohort
earnings) rather than individual male earnings as examined in this paper. See Huggett
and Kaplan (2010) for a discussion of this literature. Second, the ﬁnance literature has
put upper and lower value bounds on cash ﬂows. Cochrane and Saa-Requejo (2000) and
Cochrane (2001) develop theory, provide applications and review this literature. The
bounds literature builds on the stochastic discount factor formulation of asset pricing
problems developed by Hansen and Jagannathan (1991) and others. The basic idea in
the value bounds literature is to value the component of cash ﬂows that can be replicated
by trade in marketed assets and bound the value of the residual component. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to apply these ideas to calculate value and return
bounds on individual-level earnings. Third, the paper is related to the literature on
incomplete markets and idiosyncratic earnings risk. Speciﬁcally, market incompleteness




We assume that the asset pricing theorist knows the stochastic process governing earnings
e = {ej}J
j=1 and (gross) ﬁnancial asset returns Ri = {Ri
j}J
j=1 for i ∈ I. J denotes the
last period of the working lifetime, whereas I denotes the set of assets that the agent
observes and can trade. The agent values future earnings using a stochastic discount
factor m∗ = {m∗
j,j+1}J
j=1. The discount factor between age j and k is the product of




i,i+1. All random variables are deﬁned on some
underlying probability space (Ω,F,P) and are assumed to be square integrable.
We now deﬁne the value of human capital and the return to human capital. The value
of an agent’s human capital vj(m∗) is simply the value of future earnings discounted using
m∗. Expected values at age j are calculated using the information σ-ﬁeld Fj of the agent.
4The one-period discount factor m∗
j,j+1 is assumed to be Fj+1 measurable. We assume that
Fj is the σ-ﬁeld generated by earnings and asset returns up to period j (i.e. (ek,(Ri
k)i∈I)
for k ≤ j).1 The return to human capital Rh
j+1(m∗) is deﬁned as the random variable
which equals the sum of the earnings and value in period j + 1 divided by the period j


























Huggett and Kaplan (2010) provide a justiﬁcation for deﬁning the value of human
capital in this way. They argue that if an agent is given the opportunity to move away
from holding all the shares in his/her cash ﬂow stream ej, then when the value of these
shares is set at vj(m∗) the agent will optimally choose to always continue to hold all these
shares. While the argument for this proposition relies on a concave utility function over
consumption, it is not sensitive to the exact theoretical mechanism by which earnings are
produced. If earnings are produced with goods inputs, then it is earnings net of the value
of goods inputs that must be valued.
2.2 Bounds
We assume that the asset pricing theorist knows that the agent’s discount factor lies in the
set M. This set contains square integrable stochastic discount factors that satisfy three
restrictions. First, each one-period discount factor is non-negative. Second, the Euler
equation holds for each ﬁnancial asset available to the agent. These ﬁrst two restrictions
would be implied, from a utility theory framework, by a strictly positive marginal utility
1The theory can be extended to cover the case where Fj is ﬁner as would be the case when the agent
also observes signals providing information on future earnings and returns beyond those implied by past
earnings and returns.
5of consumption and by agent optimization. Third, all the one-period discount factors
have a second moment that is no larger than some upper bound denoted b2. This last
restriction is an auxiliary assumption rather than a restriction implied by some underlying
decision problem.
M ≡ {m : (1) mj,j+1 ≥ 0,(2) E[mj,j+1R
i




The upper and lower bounds on values and returns are simply the supremum and
inﬁmum of the possible values and returns over the set M. These are deﬁned below.

















It is important to clarify when there will be a gap between the upper bound vu
j and
the lower bound vl
j. Any gap between the value bounds will then imply a gap between
the return bounds. There can be a gap between the value bounds when it is not possible
to replicate future earnings with a trading strategy in ﬁnancial assets. Thus, market
incompleteness is key. To see this in its simplest form, consider the value in the second-
to-last period vJ−1(m). Below we rewrite vJ−1(m) using the fact that there is a unique
decomposition eJ = projJ(eJ)+ǫJ of earnings into the part projJ(eJ) in the space spanned
by ﬁnancial asset returns and the orthogonal part. The component in the space spanned by
asset returns has exactly the same value for any m ∈ M. This fact is implied by the Euler





for some weights αi
J−1.














6This decomposition makes it clear that any gap between the upper and lower value
bounds comes about when the value of the orthogonal component of earnings diﬀers across
m ∈ M. This happens when the orthogonal component ǫJ is non-zero and when there are
two discount factors m1,m2 ∈ M that covary diﬀerently with this component of earnings.
The ﬁrst criteria is an observable as the asset pricing theorist is assumed to know the
statistical process governing earnings and asset returns. In practice, empirical methods
can provide evidence on the size and nature of the orthogonal component of earnings.
The second criteria occurs when the volatility bound (restriction (3)) is large enough so
that m is suﬃciently variable to satisfy the Euler equations (restriction (2)) and there is
some additional scope for m to vary with the orthogonal component of earnings.
2.3 Relationship Between Value Bounds and Return Bounds
Next, we show that bounds on lifetime returns are implied by bounds on the value of
human capital. To see why this holds, simply restate lifetime returns as indicated below.
It is then clear that, for any draw ω ∈ Ω of shocks, lower values for human capital imply
higher values for lifetime returns. Thus, an upper bound on lifetime returns is obtained
by inserting the lower bound on values vl
j at each age into the right-hand side of this
equation. Using the same logic, a lower bound on lifetime returns is determined by the
upper bound on values vu
j . Theorem 1 argues that the least upper bound and the greatest


















Theorem 1 Let (m∗,e,[Ri : i ∈ I]) denote the agent’s stochastic discount factor, earn-
ings and asset returns. If earnings and asset returns are strictly positive and the set of





















7(ii) Rlife(m∗) ∈ [Rl
life,Ru
life] provided that the volatility bound is above the second mo-
ment of the agent’s stochastic discount factor (i.e. b2 ≥ E[(m∗
j,j+1)2|Fj],∀j).
Proof See Appendix D.
3 A Simple Example
In this section we provide a simple example to illustrate how all the concepts work. We
start by describing an environment with a single risk-free asset and permanent idiosyn-
cratic earnings shocks. This model is a ﬁnite lifetime version of the problem analyzed by
Constantinides and Duﬃe (1996). This model is useful because it allows us to express
both the value and the return to human capital in closed form. We then calculate bounds,
assuming that only the earnings process and the interest rate are known, and not the full
structure of the model.
3.1 The Model
Consider the decision problem of an agent who faces an exogenous earnings process and
can borrow and lend at a risk-free rate r. Earnings are subject to permanent shocks
arriving each model period. The agent maximizes expected utility over the lifetime.
Utility: E[
PJ
j=1βj−1u(cj)|F1], where u(c) =
(
c1−ρ
(1−ρ) : ρ > 0,ρ  = 1
log(c) : ρ = 1
Earnings: ej =
Qj
k=1zk, where lnzk ∼ N( ,σ2) is i.i.d.
Information: Fj is the σ-ﬁeld generated by (e1,...,ej)




(1) cj + aj+1 ≤ aj(1 + r) + ej,(2) cj ≥ 0,aJ+1 ≥ 0
8When the interest rate satisﬁes 1 + r = 1
β exp(ρ  −
ρ2σ2
2 ) and initial assets are zero,
then the solution to the agent’s decision problem is to set consumption equal to earnings
each period. The plausibility of this assertion can be seen by noting that the agent’s






u′(ej) . The agent’s value of human capital vj(m∗) is then
proportional to earnings each period. This implies that the agent’s realized return to
human capital Rh
j+1(m∗) is proportional to the permanent earnings shock zj+1. Lifetime
returns are then easy to determine as they are the geometric average of realized period




































− (1 − ρ)
2))
3.2 Bounds on Values and Returns
Next we consider an asset pricing theorist who has knowledge of the stochastic process
for earnings and the interest rate on the single risk-free asset. We now determine what
could be said about the value and return to the agent’s human capital, given only this
knowledge, and no other details of the decision-making environment.
We start by noting that upper and lower value bounds satisfy a Bellman equation. We
focus on the Bellman equation for the upper bound since the lower bound can be handled
by replacing the supremum with the inﬁmum operation. The state variable in Bellman’s
equation is current earnings ej as earnings are Markovian.
vu
j (ej) = supmj,j+1 E[mj,j+1(vu
j+1(ej+1) + ej+1)|ej] s.t.
9(1) mj,j+1 ≥ 0, (2) E[mj,j+1(1 + r)|ej] = 1 and (3) E[m2
j,j+1|ej] ≤ b2
To solve Bellman’s equation, two facts are useful. First, bounds are linear in current
earnings: vu
j (e) = γu
j e. This follows from backwards recursion using the fact that shocks
are multiplicative ej+1 = ejzj+1 and zj+1 is independent of ej. Second, a simple recursion
governs the coeﬃcients: γu
j = (γu
j+1 + 1)γu




J−1)J−k. Thus, calculating all the upper bounds boils down to ﬁnding γu
J−1 =
vu
J−1(1) = sup{m:(1)−(3)hold} E[mJ−1,Jz].
Bounds on returns are now easy to state for this model. Theorem 1 tells one that lower
bounds on the realized lifetime returns are determined by upper bounds on the value of
human capital. Furthermore, value bounds are proportional to realized earnings. These
statements are summarized in the ﬁrst equation below. The second and third equation
below state bounds on mean lifetime returns based on the bound for realized returns.
Theorem 1 implies that E[Rl
life|F1] ≤ E[Rlife(m∗)|F1] ≤ E[Ru
life|F1], provided that the
exogenously conjectured volatility bound b2 is at least as large as the second moment of
the agent’s stochastic discount factor. Shortly, we will use these equations to calculate

















































3.3 Quantitative Properties of Values and Returns
We analyze a quantitative version of this model to illustrate how all these ideas work
together. The interest rate is set to r = 0.01 and the agent’s lifetime is set to J = 46
model periods. Earnings parameters are set so that the mean earnings proﬁle equals 1
each model period:   = −σ2/2. We allow a one standard deviation shock to earnings to
10vary from zero to a twenty percent shock. These assumptions are suﬃcient to calculate
bounds on values and returns. To calculate the true value and return to human capital,
in addition it is necessary to specify the preference parameters, and to ensure that the
interest rate assumption used in the construction of the solution to the decision problem
holds. To achieve this, we set an agent’s coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion to ρ = 2 and





Figure 1(a) displays upper and lower value bounds for diﬀerent magnitudes of the
standard deviation σ of log earnings shocks.2 These value bounds are based on an ex-
ogenously speciﬁed volatility bound which we set equal to the true second moment of the
agent’s stochastic discount factor (i.e. b2 ≡ E[m∗2
j,j+1|Fj]) for each value of σ. Figure 1(a)
shows that the bounds on values fan out as earnings risk increases. The true value of
human capital v1(m∗) is also displayed in Figure 1(a). The true value is diﬃcult to see in
this Figure as it is always very close to the computed lower bound.3
Figure 1(a) shows that the value of an agent’s human capital falls as the shock vari-
ance increases. To help understand this result, below we decompose the value into two
components: the value of the mean earnings proﬁle and the value of the residual (orthog-
onal) component of earnings ǫk ≡ ek −E[ek|F1]). These can be viewed as the value of the
earnings component spanned by asset returns and the value of the orthogonal component.
The ﬁrst component is exactly the same for each model because both the mean earnings
proﬁle and the mean of the agent’s stochastic discount factor are the same. Furthermore,
the ﬁrst component can be precisely valued without knowledge of the precise nature of
the agent’s stochastic discount factor m∗. Thus, the value of human capital is lower with
risk than in the no earnings risk case because the value of the orthogonal component of
earnings is negative with risk. This occurs because an agent’s stochastic discount factor
2The bounds are calculated using the theory from the previous subsection and using computational
methods to calculate (γu
J−1,γl
J−1). To compute these two quantities, we discretize the shock process and
numerically solve the optimization problem. All programs used to compute results can be found at the
journal’s website.
3This is not too surprising. The agent’s true stochastic discount factor comoves negatively with
earnings. The stochastic discount factor that achieves the lower bound on the value of human capital
will also comove negatively with earnings and will by construction have the same ﬁrst two moments as
the agent’s true stochastic discount factor.


















Figure 1(b) displays the mean lifetime return on human capital and the upper and
lower bound on expected lifetime returns. These are calculated based upon the formulas
derived in section 3.2. Figure 1(b) shows that the true mean lifetime return increases
as risk increases and that the upper bound on lifetime returns closely approximates the
agent’s true mean return.
The cone-shaped areas in Figure 1 can be interpreted as follows. An empirical re-
searcher could impose parametric assumptions on the utility function and make speciﬁc
assumptions on the nature of an agent’s budget constraint. Given a procedure for select-
ing these parameters, the value and return to human capital could be calculated using
the stochastic discount factor resulting from a solution to the agent’s decision problem.
Applying such a procedure for each value of the earnings risk σ, would produce a map
or correspondence living within the cone-shaped areas of Figure 1. This holds regardless
of the parametric class of utility functions that the researcher speciﬁes, provided that
the Euler equation restriction holds. However, it is key that the second moment of the
agent’s stochastic discount factor inferred from such a parametric procedure is not above
the value employed in calculating the bounds.
3.4 Additional Restrictions on M
Within the simple example analyzed, it may seem unreasonable that the class M of
stochastic discount factors allows discount factors to covary positively with the orthogonal
component of earnings. However, this is precisely what happens at the upper bound on
values and the lower bound on returns. Thus, one can ask whether or not theory puts
restrictions on M beyond those employed so far. For example, is the covariation always
non-positive with the othogonal component of earnings?
Claim 1 presents a simple result on this question. It proves that within a two-period
model with exogenous earnings this covariation is always non-positive. In this claim E2



















Claim 1 Assume U(c1,c2) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and diﬀerentiable. At
a solution to Problem P1, where m∗ =
U2(c1,c2)
E1[U1(c1,c2)] and ǫ2 ≡ e2 − E2[e2], we have that
(1) E1[m∗ǫ2] ≤ 0 and (2) v1(m∗) ≡ E1[m∗e2] ≤ E1[m∗E2[e2]]
Proof (1) E1[m∗ǫ2] = E1[E2[m∗ǫ2]] ≤ E1[E2[m∗]E2[ǫ2]] = 0. The leftmost equality holds
by the law of iterated expectations. The inequality holds as the conditional covariance be-
tween m∗ and ǫ2 is non-positive. This holds as, conditioned on second period asset returns,
m∗ decreases as ǫ2 increases by concavity. The rightmost equality holds as E2[ǫ2] = 0. (2)
This is implied by (1). ⋄
Claim 1 implies that in the simple example from section 3.1, with only two model
periods (J = 2) and with a ﬂat mean earnings proﬁle, the upper bound on values and
the lower bound on returns are now tighter: v1(m∗) = E1[m∗e2] ≤ e1/R and E1[Rh
2] =
E1[ e2
v1(m∗)] ≥ E1[ e2
e1/R] = R.
Extending this simple result beyond two periods is not straightforward for general
earnings and returns structures. It would be suﬃcient to show that future consumption
increases with a positive innovation to earnings, conditioned on returns. Establishing this
is not so simple as future consumption now depends on an endogenous future savings
decision.
We show that a multi-period analog to Claim 1 holds for the purely temporary com-
ponent of earnings variation within models where earnings are exogenous and have a
Markovian shock structure. Claim 2 presents this result when earnings ej = ¯ ejνj are the
product of an independent shock νj and a Markovian component ¯ ej. The earnings residual
13ǫj is then ǫj ≡ ej − ˆ Ej[ej], where the expectations operator is conditioned on all period
j earnings and return information except the realization of the independent temporary















j + ej;aJ+1 ≥ 0
Claim 2 Assume u(c) is strictly increasing, strictly concave and diﬀerentiable and that
earnings have an independent shock component which is multiplicative. At an interior
solution to Problem P2, where m∗
j,j+1 =
βu′(cj+1)
u′(cj) , we have Ej[m∗
j,j+1ǫj+1] ≤ 0,∀j.
Proof Note that Ej[m∗
j,j+1ǫj+1] = Ej[ ˆ Ej+1[m∗
j,j+1ǫj+1]] ≤ Ej[ ˆ Ej+1[m∗
j,j+1] ˆ Ej+1[ǫj+1]] = 0.
The leftmost equality holds by the law of iterated expectations. The inequality holds
provided the conditional covariance is non-positive. The rightmost equality holds as
ˆ Ej+1[ǫj+1] = 0.
It remains to show that the conditional covariance is non-positive. It is suﬃcient to
show that cj+1 is increasing in νj+1, other things equal, as then ǫj+1 increases and mj,j+1
decreases as νj+1 increases. Given the Markovian structure, we can pose Problem P2
recursively and view consumption cj+1(wj+1,zj+1,νj+1) as a function of a vector of state
variables, where zj+1 summarizes the information in asset returns and all components of






vj(wj,zj,νj) = maxu(cj) + βEj[vj+1(wj+1,zj+1,νj+1)]
cj + aj+1 ≤ wj + ej
A standard result for this type of problem is that at an interior solution the value function
is increasing, concave and diﬀerentiable in w and d
vj(wj,zj,νj)
dwj = u′(cj(wj,zj,νj)). These
14properties are established by backwards induction using the corresponding properties of
u. Concavity of the value function then implies that cj must increase in wj, other things
equal. By independence, an increase in νj is equivalent to an appropriate increase in
ﬁnancial wealth. Thus, cj also must increase in νj, other things equal. ⋄
4 Earnings and Asset Returns: Empirics
We now turn to applying these ideas to calculate bounds on human capital values and
returns using U.S. data. To operationalize the concepts introduced in Section 2 it is
necessary to have knowledge of (1) the set of assets that are actively traded by households
and (2) the joint stochastic structure of earnings and asset returns. Regarding the set of
actively traded ﬁnancial assets, we focus our analysis on the case of two assets: one risky
(equities) and one riskless (bonds). We review evidence on how widely these two assets
classes are held by U.S. households.
Campbell (2006) analyzes participation rates of U.S. households in diﬀerent asset
classes using the 2001 Survey of Consumer Finances. He ﬁnds that safe assets (e.g.
checking, saving and money market accounts) and vehicles are very widely held across
households. These two asset classes are held by at least 80 percent of households within
any percentile of the total asset holding distribution, except for households in the bottom
10 percent of the asset holding distribution. Thus, assuming that the Euler equation holds
for a low-risk asset is well motivated. The evidence for holding equity is more mixed.
Within the top 25 percent of the asset holding distribution, Campbell (2006) ﬁnds that
more than 80 percent of U.S. households hold public equity. However, within the bottom
25 percent of the asset holding distribution less than 40 percent of U.S. households hold
public equity. He also ﬁnds that participation in equity markets rises sustantially with
the level of education. Thus, we think that the assumption that the Euler equation for
equities holds is better supported for the college education sample that we analyze than
for the high school education sample.
154.1 Stochastic Model for Earnings
The statistical model of earnings that we estimate is broadly similar to the model analyzed
in Storesletten, Telmer and Yaron (2004). In this model yi,j,t denotes the logarithm of
annual earnings for individual i of age j in year t. We assume that yi,j,t is comprised of
ﬁve orthogonal components:
yi,j,t = φt + κj + fi + zi,j,t + εi,j,t
zi,j,t = ρzi,j−1,t−1 + ηi,j,t
zi,0,t = 0.
The ﬁrst two components are aggregate. φt is a stochastic time eﬀect that reﬂects
changes in aggregate labor productivity that are common to all workers. κj is a deter-
ministic experience proﬁle that we model as quartic polynomial in age.
The remaining three terms are individual-speciﬁc. fi ∼ N(0,σ2
f) is an individual-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect, ηi,j,t ∼ N(0,σ2
η,t) is an idiosyncratic persistent shock and εi,j,t ∼
N(0,σ2
ε,t) is a purely transitory idiosyncratic shock.4
We estimate the model using data on male annual labor earnings from the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) from 1967 to 1996. We restrict attention to male heads of
households between ages 25 and 55. Thus, we value individual earnings over the ages
25 to 55. Hence in our calculations, human capital values are zero after age 55. We
divide the sample into high school (HS) and college (COL) sub-samples, based on their
maximum observed completed years of education. Individuals with 12 or fewer years
of education are labeled HS while those with more than 12 years are labeled COL. We
hence make no distinction between high-school dropouts and high-school graduates on
one hand, and college dropouts, college graduates and post-graduates on the other hand.
Our measure of annual gross labor earnings includes pre-tax wages and salaries from all
jobs, plus commision, tips, bonuses and overtime, as well as the labor part of income from
self-employment. Labor earnings are inﬂated to 2008 dollars using the CPI All Urban
series. Full details can be found in Appendix A.
4When estimating the model we allow for time eﬀects in both the persistent and transitory variance.
However, we restrict these to be constant when calculating bounds.
16Table 1: Parameter estimates for idiosyncratic earnings process
ALL HS COL
σ2
f 0.161 0.149 0.154
(0.011) (0.015) (0.013)
ρ 0.934 0.835 0.915
(0.025) (0.067) (0.030)
σ2
η 0.034 0.048 0.038
(0.007) (0.016) (0.008)
σ2
ε 0.128 0.125 0.111
(0.011) (0.018) (0.011)
Notes: Standard errors computed by block bootstrap with 250 repetitions. Reported parameter estimates
for σ2
η and σ2
ε are averages over 1967 to 1996. Estimation allows for time eﬀect in both these variances.
Standard errors are bootstrap standard errors of the averages. See Appendix B for details.
The model is estimated in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage we use OLS to estimate the
age proﬁle, ˆ κj, and the year eﬀects, ˆ φt. Residuals from the ﬁrst stage are then used to
obtain GMM estimates of the remaining parameters, where the moments included are the
elements of the auto-covariance function for each age/year combination. Full details of
the estimation procedure can be found in Appendix B. Parameter estimates are shown in
Table 1. These results are consistent with estimates from similar speciﬁcations that have
been estimated elsewhere in the literature summarized in Meghir and Pistaferri (2010).
4.2 Asset Returns
We use monthly returns on 1-month treasury bills, averaged over the calendar year, as
data for the annual risk-free rate, r
f
t . Equity returns, re
t, are annual returns on a value-
weighted portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ stocks including dividends, from
1967-2004.5 Real returns on both assets are calculated by adjusting for realized inﬂation
using the same CPI All Urban series that was applied to the earnings data. Table 2
displays summary statistics of the log gross real return for this time period.
5All returns data come from Kenneth French and are available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/
pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html




t ) 1.26% 2.40%
log(1 + re
t) 5.72% 17.50%
Notes: Risk-free rate is average monthly return on 1-month treasury bills, averaged over the calendar
year. Equity returns are annual returns on a NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ value-weighted portfolio including
dividends.
4.3 Joint Dynamics of Earnings and Asset Returns
Although the PSID is an ideal data set for studying the auto-correlation structure of
individual earnings, its relatively small sample size and the fact that after 1996 it was
converted into a biannual survey means that it is less suited to studying dynamics in the
aggregate component φt of earnings. Our approach is to retain the PSID as our data source
for the idiosyncratic component of earnings but to also analyze an alternative measure of
the aggregate component of labor earnings φt estimated using Current Population Survey
(CPS) data. We estimate this component from CPS data in the same way as we do in
the PSID: we run a ﬁrst stage regression of individual log earnings on a polynomial in age
and on time dummy variables. We remove the low-frequency component of our estimate
of φt by removing a linear trend.6 We denote the deviations of the estimate of φt from
trend as Yt. See Appendix A for further details.
We work with demeaned equity returns data of the form Qt = log(1 + re
t). By con-
struction, our measure of aggregate earnings has mean zero.
The joint dynamics of aggregate earnings and equity returns are assumed to follow an














6We have also examined the sensitivity of our estimates to using a Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter to remove
the low-frequency components and obtain very similar results. We choose to focus on the linear trend
for the sake of transparency. An alternative approach would have been to work with growth rates rather
than levels of the relevant series.
18Table 3: Parameter estimates for VAR
PSID: ALL PSID: HS PSID: COL CPS: ALL CPS: HS CPS: COL
A
Yt: Yt−1 0.864** 0.971** 0.843** 0.959** 1.006** 0.931**
Qt−1 0.101** 0.122** 0.101* 0.076** 0.081** 0.078**
Qt: Yt−1 -1.408* -2.053** -1.051* -1.436** -1.389** -1.146*
Qt−1 -0.193 -0.244 -0.165 -0.107 -0.099 -0.078
Σ
ΣY Y (×10−3) 0.751 0.492 1.270 0.552 0.516 0.763
ΣQQ(×10−0) 0.024 0.020 0.024 0.025 0.025 0.026
ΣY Q(×10−3) -0.804 0.192 -0.887 0.186 0.405 0.061
Notes: (**) signiﬁcant at 1% level. (*) signiﬁcant at 5% level. PSID data are from 1967-1996, CPS data
are from 1967-2004
Parameter estimates from this VAR are reported in Table 3 and the implied steady-
state dynamics are reported in Table 4. The stochastic properties of the VAR in Table
4 are for the most part similar across the two deﬁnitions of aggregate earnings. The
parameter estimates for all cases reveal a high degree of persistence in aggregate earnings,
although the autocorrelation of the aggregate component of earnings in CPS data is
slightly higher than that in PSID data (around 0.87 vs 0.75). In all speciﬁcations we also
ﬁnd a moderate negative contemporaneous correlation (around −0.35) between one-period
equity returns and aggregate labor income.
5 Bounds on Values and Returns
5.1 Volatilty Bound on Stochastic Discount Factor
To compute value bounds we need to set the parameter b2 governing the upper bound on
the second moment of an agent’s stochastic discount factor. A simple rearrangement of the
Euler Equation produces the well-known restriction below on the coeﬃcient of variation
19Table 4: Implied steady-sate statistics from VAR
PSID CPS
ALL HS COL ALL HS COL
sd(Yt): Data 0.050 0.062 0.046 0.054 0.060 0.057
Model 0.045 0.046 0.058 0.054 0.065 0.059
sd(Rt): Data 0.167 0.167 0.167 0.175 0.175 0.175
Model 0.166 0.167 0.167 0.174 0.179 0.173
corr(Yt,Rt): Data -0.364 -0.325 -0.394 -0.370 -0.344 -0.343
Model -0.390 -0.427 -0.359 -0.359 -0.411 -0.323
corr(Yt,Yt−1): Data 0.754 0.756 0.774 0.869 0.858 0.889
Model 0.719 0.783 0.738 0.871 0.916 0.857
corr(Rt,Rt−1): Data -0.089 -0.089 -0.089 0.061 0.061 0.061
Model -0.043 0.000 -0.034 0.054 0.110 0.048
corr(Yt,Rt−1): Data -0.030 -0.065 0.019 -0.117 -0.102 -0.105
Model 0.033 0.023 -0.012 -0.100 -0.192 -0.072
corr(Rt,Yt−1): Data -0.179 -0.163 -0.371 -0.403 -0.365 -0.411
Model -0.310 -0.466 -0.305 -0.408 -0.467 -0.365
Notes: Table shows average moments in the data, together with implied steady-state statistics from
the corresponding estimated vector auto-regression. PSID data are from 1967-1996, CPS data are from
1967-2004
20of one period stochastic discount factors. This restriction states that the coeﬃcient of
variation is at least as large as the conditional Sharpe ratio, where Rx
























We choose values of the parameter b2 so that the coeﬃcient of variation of the stochas-
tic discount factor is no larger than a given multiple (α) of the conditional Sharpe ratio.
Because our assumed stochastic process for aggregate labor earnings and equity returns
features variation in the conditional mean of returns, but not the conditional variance,
the conditional Sharpe ratio will vary across realizations of earnings and returns. Since
we impose bounds that are constant multiples of the conditional Sharpe ratio, this implies
that the raw bound (b2 in the terminology of Section 2) varies across the state space. The
set of values for this multiple that we consider is α ∈ {1.1,1.5,2.0,4.0}. Thus, we explore
a tight upper bound that allows only slightly more variation than is needed to satisfy the
Euler equations for equity and debt (α = 1.1) as well as those that allow substantially
more variation (α = 4). A tight upper bound means that there is only a little room for the
stochastic discount factor to move with or against the orthogonal component of earnings.
5.2 Properties of Value Bounds
To calculate bounds on human capital values, we use recursive methods to solve for the
upper and lower bounds at each age at each point in the state space for earnings and
returns.7 We take as given that earnings and returns follow the statistical model esti-
mated in section 4. We then simulate a large number of realizations of the idiosyncratic
earnings shocks, attaching to each simulated agent his own simulated path for the aggre-
gate component of earnings and the return on the risky asset. We report the mean of
the upper and lower bounds at each age. All bounds are reported with a value for the
individual-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect equal to zero (i.e. fi = 0). Bounds for other values for
the ﬁxed eﬀect can be obtained by scaling the upper and lower bounds proportionately
7See Appendix C for computational details.
21using exp(fi). All of the results we report are based on the CPS estimates from Table
3 for the aggregates (returns and aggregate earnings) and the Table 1 estimates for the
idiosyncratic component of earnings.
Figure 2 reports the upper and lower bounds for the High School and College sub-
samples and for the combined sample. Along with the bounds, we plot the expected
discounted value for earnings. This is a natural benchmark with which to compare the
size of the bounds. It reﬂects the value that one would attach to an individual’s labor
earnings if they were discounted at the risk-free rate.
We ﬁnd that value bounds are wide. Even with our most restrictive bound on the
volatility of the stochastic discount factor, the gap between the upper and lower value
bound at young ages is far larger than the diﬀerence in the expected discounted value of
earnings across education groups. This implies that the restrictions, highlighted in section
2, coming from asset returns and earnings alone only loosely pin down the value of human
capital. This holds both in the full sample and for both education groups.
Note, however, that the width of the value bounds, and their dependence on the level
of α, stem strongly from the upper bound. Large values for the upper bound are attained
by stochastic discount factors that have a strong positive covariation with earnings. In
Section 3.4 we discuss that in certain cases theory allows one to impose additional re-
strictions that rule out positive covariation of various types. We now impose that the
component of earnings which is orthogonal to asset returns does not covary positively
with the stochastic discount factor. This is a stonger condition than was formally justi-
ﬁed. Recall that Claim 2 from section 3 ruled out positive covariation for only the purely
temporary component of earnings variation.
Figure 2(d) shows that imposing this additional constraint substantially tightens the
upper bound for values. For example, the average reduction in the upper bound for the full
sample with α = 2.0 is a factor of 1.6. The additional constraint on the set of stochastic
discount factors does not alter any of the lower bounds.
225.3 Properties of Return Bounds
We construct upper and lower bounds on returns. Returns bounds are calculated by sim-
ulating a large number of paths for the upper and lower bounds on values, and calculating
the bounds on returns that are implied by each of these paths based on Theorem 1. We
report the means of these lifetime return bounds in Table 5 and note that (i) they are
wide and (ii) in no case is the lower bound positive. These ﬁndings further stress the
results from the bounds on values: even with tight restrictions on the volatility of the
stochastic discount factor, equity returns and the risk-free rate do not imply tight bounds
for the return on human capital.
It is also possible to construct a life-cycle proﬁle for return bounds. After any sequence
of shock realizations up to age j, one can deﬁne a lifetime return after that age and history
as the geometric average of future returns to human capital. We construct bounds for
these returns and plot the mean return bound at each age in Figure 3. The bounds tend
to fan out with age. Thus, examining returns over a shorter interval of the remaining
lifetime does not result in tighter bounds than those in Table 5. This holds for the full
sample and for both education levels. We note that the lower bound on the return at the
end of the working lifetime (age 55) in Figure 3(d) is positive. This is consistent with
the general spirit of Claim 1 from section 3. Claim 1 says that the orthogonal component
of earnings in the last period, given returns, cannot covary positively with the agent’s
discount factor and thus this component of earnings can only serve to lower the value of
an individual’s human capital in the second to last period of the working lifetime.
6 What Type of Earnings Risk Matters for Bounds?
In this section we assess which factors are important for the width of the bounds reported
in Section 5. We ﬁrst show that idiosyncratic risk, rather than aggregate risk, accounts
for almost all of the width of the bounds. We then argue that early in life, persistent
shocks account for most of the gap between the upper and lower bound, while closer to
retirement, transitory shocks are more important.
Figure 4 displays value bounds for the combined sample from a version of the model
23Table 5: Bounds on expected lifetime returns (%)
High School College Full Sample
Bound Lower Upper Lower Upper Lower Lower* Upper
(α)
1.1 −12.4 23.6 −11.2 17.5 −10.3 −5.1 17.0
1.5 −13.7 29.7 −12.5 20.6 −11.6 −6.1 19.4
2.0 −14.8 36.1 −13.7 23.7 −12.7 −6.9 21.8
4.0 −16.8 55.5 −15.9 32.0 −14.9 −9.1 27.3
Notes: ‘Lower*’ refers to bounds calculated by imposing the additional restriction that the covariance
between the orthogonal component of earnings and the stochastic discount factor is non-positive.
without aggregate earnings shocks (4(a)) and without idiosyncratic shocks (4(b)). To
calculate bounds in the absence of aggregate shocks, we construct an AR(1) process
for equity returns that has unconditional moments that are the same as the marginal
moments for equity returns from the estimated VAR. Removing aggregate shocks narrows
the bounds by roughly a factor of 2, but the bounds are still wide.
In contrast, when the only source of earnings risk is aggregate shocks (i.e. idiosyncratic
risk is completely removed) the value of human capital is almost uniquely determined.
Bounds are not degenerate: they are just so narrow that when plotted on the same scale
as the original bounds they appear to be a single line. The value bounds for this case
imply that lifetime expected net returns must lie between 0.25% and 2.50%.8
We conclude that with an empirically plausible joint stochastic process for aggregate
earnings and equity returns, it is precisely idiosyncratic risk that makes it diﬃcult to pin
down the value and return to human capital using data on asset returns and earnings
alone. Absent idiosyncratic risk, the weak restrictions we impose on stochastic discount
factors, that are used in ﬁnance, would usefully pin down human capital values and
returns.
Next, we investigate which type of idiosyncratic earnings risk is responsible for the
8Repeating this exercise, we ﬁnd lifetime expected return bounds of (.10,2.6) for the College sample
and (.23,2.6) for the High School sample.
24width of bounds. Figure 5 displays value bounds when we retain only persistent earnings
shocks (5(a)) and only transitory earnings shocks (5(b)). Overall, both types of risk appear
to contribute to wide bounds. However, there are important diﬀerences over the life cycle.
For young agents, there are many remaining years to feel the eﬀects of persistent shocks,
so these contribute a great deal to the width of bounds. For older agents, persistent
shocks are less important, because there are fewer years to realize their eﬀects.
7 Final Remarks
We have constructed bounds on the value of human capital and then used these bounds to
construct bounds on the lifetime return to human capital. The bounds are derived from
knowledge of the set of traded assets, the joint stochastic process for individual earnings
and asset returns, as well as three assumptions about an individual’s stochastic discount
factors: they are (i) non-negative, (ii) satisfy an Euler equation for each asset and (iii)
have a second moment no larger than some pre-speciﬁed upper bound.
Using U.S. data, we ﬁnd that value and return bounds are quite wide. Even allowing
for only slightly more variation in the stochastic discount factor than is needed to price
equity and debt, we ﬁnd that earnings and asset returns data can only restrict the mean
lifetime return on human capital to lie between -5 percent and 17 percent per year. The
vast majority of the gap is due to the idiosyncratic component of earnings risk. Absent
the idiosyncratic component of earnings risk, the average lifetime return on human capital
is between 0.25 and 2.5 percent per year - not far from the average risk-free rate. One of
the main messages of these ﬁndings is that to learn something sharper about the return
to an individual’s human capital will require a structural approach. Huggett and Kaplan
(2010) take up this challenge and use a fully speciﬁed structural model with idiosyncratic
and aggregate sources of earnings risk to measure the value and return to human capital.
We highlight two challenges to the empirical ﬁndings of this paper that might be
taken up in future work. First, the statistical model of earnings analyzed in section 4 may
overstate the magnitude of persistent idiosyncratic earnings shocks. Huggett, Ventura
and Yaron (2007) argue that learning ability diﬀerences across individuals can account
25for much of the large rise in the variance of log earnings observed over the working lifetime.
Thus, the role of persistent shocks may be substantially smaller than what we infer in
Table 1. Second, we have assumed that the aggregate component of male earnings has
a deterministic trend. Future work can investigate the possibility of stochastic trends or
cointegration between the aggregate component of earnings and equity returns. These
possibilities may give the aggregate component of earnings a larger role in producing
higher mean returns to human capital.
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27A Data and Sample Selection
We use the core PSID sample from waves 1968 to 1997, which refer to earnings in years 1967
to 1996. After 1997 the PSID became a bi-annual survey, hence we exclude the more recent
waves. We restrict attention to male heads of household between the ages of 25 and 55 with
annual labor income of at least $1000 in 2008 dollars. Our measure of annual labor income
includes pre-tax wages and salaries from all jobs, plus commission, tips, bonuses and overtime,
as well as the labor part of income from self-employment. Our ﬁnal sample contains 54,589
observations on 5,130 individuals. The median number of annual observations per individual
is 9. We construct three education samples: one comprising all males (ALL), one comprising
males with 12 or fewer years of education (HS) and one comprising males with more than 12
years of education (COL). Our CPS data comes from the IPUMS database of March Outgoing
Rotation Groups. We use data on earnings from 1967 to 2004. The aggregate components
of labor earnings for each subsample are measured as the coeﬃcients on year dummies in a
regression that is analogous to the one described below.
B Estimation of Idiosyncratic Earnings Model
Estimation is done in two stages. In the ﬁrst stage we estimate φt and κj by regressing log real
annual earnings on a quartic polynomial in age and a full set of year dummies. This is done sep-
arately for the three education samples. Residuals from the ﬁrst-stage regression are then used








The auto-covariance function for residual log-earnings is calculated for up to 10 lags for every
age/year combination. For this purpose, individuals are grouped into 5-year age cells so that
when calculating covariances at age j, individuals aged j ∈ [j − 2,j + 2] are used. Only cells
with at least 30 observations are retained. A GMM estimator is then used to estimate the
parameters, where the moments included are the elements of the auto-covariance function. The
moments are weighted by n0.5
j,t,l where nj,t,l is the number of observations used to calculate the
covariance at lag l in year t for age j. Since the permanent shock and the transitory shock are
not separately identiﬁed in the last period, we assume that σ2
η,T = σ2
η,T−1. Individuals aged 25
to 55 are used to construct the empirical auto-covariance functions. This means that variances
and covariance from ages 27 to 53 are eﬀectively used in the estimation. Standard errors are
calculated by bootstrap with 250 repetitions, thus accounting for estimation error induced by
the ﬁrst-stage estimation.
C Computational Details
Bounds are calculated using backwards recursion, starting from a value of zero in retirement.
We discretize the state space using 5 points for the return on the risky asset, 5 points for
28the aggregate component of earnings, 5 points for the persistent idiosyncratic component and
5 points for the transitory component. Bounds are calculated for a value of the ﬁxed eﬀect
equal to zero. Note that bounds for other values of the ﬁxed eﬀect are just multiples of these
bounds. With a discrete state space for earnings and asset returns the calculation of bounds
can be recast as a linear optimization problem in the state-speciﬁc values of the stochastic
discount factor, subject to linear constraints (the Euler equations), non-negativity constraints
and a single quadratic constraint (the volatility bound on the SDF). We use a semi-deﬁnite
progamming algortithm (SeDuMi 1.21 implemented in Matlab) to perform this optimization.
Speciﬁcally, we solve the following ﬁnite horizon dynamic programming problem, where ˜ xj is
the vector of state variables that is relevant for forecasting future earnings and asset returns, εj
is the transitory component of earnings and xj = (˜ xj,εj). Note that ˜ xj has three components:
two from the VAR and one from the persistent idiosyncratic shock. We use mj to denote one-
period stochastic discount factors, ej to denote earnings, Re
j to denote the return on equities
and Rf to denote the risk-free rate. To calculate upper bounds on values we solve
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ej+1 (xj+1) + vu
j+1 (˜ xj+1)
i
Pr(xj+1 | ˜ xj)
subject to:














2 Pr(xj+1 | ˜ xj) ≤ b2
Lower bounds are calculated by replacing the max operator with a min operator. We impose
the constraint that the covariance between the stochastic discount factor and the orthogonal
component of earnings is non-positive by adding the following constraint
X
xj+1





˜ ej+1 (xj+1)Pr(xj+1 | ˜ xj)






D Proof of Theorem 1
(i) We focus on proving the upper bound result as the lower bound result follows by a parallel
argument. The inequality below provides an upper bound to Rlife(m),∀m ∈ M, given ¯ ω ∈ Ω.
29In stating the inequality, we note that (Rlife(m),vj(m),vl
j,ej) are all random variables. We hide
























This candidate upper bound is the least upper bound if ∀ǫ > 0,∃m ∈ M such that condition
vj(m) − vl








in these strictly positive realized values.
We now construct an m ∈ M with this property. Given any ǫ > 0, suppose we have an
m1 ∈ M such that vj(m1) − vl
j < ǫ for all j ≤ k, given ¯ ω ∈ Ω. This clearly holds for k = 1. By
the deﬁnition of the inﬁmum, ∃m2 ∈ M such that vk+1(m2) − vl
k+1 < ǫ, given ¯ ω ∈ Ω. Deﬁne
m3, as indicated below, so that vj(m3) − vl
j < ǫ for all j ≤ k + 1. Clearly, m3 ∈ M as it is
constructed from m1,m2 ∈ M. Repeating this construction to apply for all ages, establishes





j,j+1(ω) : ∀j ≥ k + 1,∀ω ∈ Fk+1 if vk+1(m2)(¯ ω) < vk+1(m1)(¯ ω)
m1
j,j+1(ω) : all other cases
Fk ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : ∀j ≤ k,ej(ω) = ej(¯ ω) and Ri
j(ω) = Ri
j(¯ ω),∀i ∈ I}
(ii) Since m∗ ∈ M, Rlife(m∗) ∈ [Rl
life,Ru
life]. ⋄










True value with ρ=2
Lower Bound
(a) Value Bounds










True return with ρ=2
Lower Bound
(b) Returns Bounds
Figure 1: Bounds on values and return for model in Section 3, by standard deviation of
earnings shocks (σ)































































(d) Full Sample (with additional constraint)
Figure 2: Bounds on human capital values
Notes: All plots show upper and lower bounds for the value of human capital as a function of age.
Units are 2008 dollars. Bounds are reported for multiples of the conditional Sharpe ratio in the set
{1.1,1.5,2,4}. The thin black line is the expected present value of earnings discounted at the risk-free
rate. See text for further details.























































(d) Full Sample (with additional constraint)
Figure 3: Bounds on human capital returns
Notes: All plots show upper and lower bounds for the gross expected lifetime return to human capital as a
function of age. Bounds are reported for multiples of the conditional Sharpe ratio in the set {1.1,1.5,2,4}.
See text for further details.















(a) Only Idiosyncratic Shocks: Values















(b) Only Aggregate Shocks: Values













(c) Only Idiosyncratic Shocks: Returns













(d) Only Aggregate Shocks: Returns
Figure 4: Human Capital Values and Returns: Aggregate vs Idiosyncratic Shocks
Notes: Plots (a) and (b) show upper and lower bounds for the value of human capital as a function of
age. Units are 2008 dollars. Plots (c) and (d) show upper and lower bounds for the gross expected lifetime
return to human capital as a function of age. Bounds are reported for multiples of the conditional Sharpe
ratio in the set {1.1,1.5,2,4}. The thin black line is the expected present value of earnings discounted
at the risk-free rate. See text for further details.















(a) Only Persistent Shocks















(b) Only Transitory Shocks
Figure 5: Persistent vs transitory idiosyncratic risk
Notes: Plots show upper and lower bounds for the value of human capital as a function of
age. Units are 2008 dollars. Bounds are reported for multiples of the conditional Sharpe
ratio in the set {1.1,1.5,2,4}. The thin black line is the expected present value of earnings
discounted at the risk-free rate. See text for further details.
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